An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes
从工会不了解企业未来盈利能力的简单谈判模型出发，推导出关于罢工发生率和无条件持续时间的预测，并用1973-77年美国主要合同谈判的微观数据进行了检验。
Recent developments in the theory of strategic bargaining demonstrate how informational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining. The se models can be applied to contract negotiations, yielding an economic theory of strikes. To date, few empirical tests of these models have been carried out. In this paper, a set of predictions concerning the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple bargaining model in which the union is uncertain about the firm's future profitability. These predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major U.S. contract negotiations that took place from 1973-77. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.