Confining the Coase Theorem: Contracting, Ownership, and Free-Riding
通过非合作契约谈判模型，研究科斯定理的成立条件：两人时均衡有效，但多人自愿参与下公共品供给因策略性回避契约而低效，集体所有权可避免搭便车。
If individuals own the right to take any action that they please, and are free to contract about behaviour, will outcomes be efficient in all situations? That is, does the Coase theorem hold? We study this classic question through the lens of a non-cooperative model of contract negotiations, considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations. In either case, we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players. But if participation is voluntary, and there are more than two players, there are situations in which all consistent equilibria are inefficient. Specifically, the provision of public goods tends to be inefficiently low due to strategic abstention from contracting. Free-riding on others' agreements can be avoided if individuals do not own all their actions. When actions involve the use of assets, efficient action ownership may correspond to collective rather than individual asset ownership.