Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights
研究了消费者撤回权（如欧盟远程销售合同法规）对最优销售合同的影响，发现当加入事后参与约束时，最优合同变为静态且不再序贯揭示信息，并开发了识别全局约束的新方法。
We introduce ex post participation constraints in the standard sequential screening model. This captures the presence of consumer withdrawal rights as, for instance, mandated by European Union regulation of “distance sales contracts”. With such additional constraints, the optimal contract is static and, unlike with only ex ante participation constraints, does not elicit the agent's information sequentially. This holds whenever differences in ex ante and ex post outside options are below a positive upper bound. Welfare effects of mandatory withdrawal rights are ambiguous. Since it is insufficient in our setting to consider only local incentive constraints, we develop a novel technique to identify the relevant global constraints.