Privatization Policy in an International Oligopoly
研究了国际寡头市场中的私有化政策，发现私有化拍卖中对外国投资者的平等待遇对国内福利的损害小于绿地投资，且小规模本地股权要求有益而大规模则适得其反。
This paper studies privatization policy in an international oligopoly. The argument that equal treatment of foreign investors will be detrimental to domestic welfare by shifting profits from domestic to foreign firms is shown to be less relevant in privatization auctions than for greenfield FDI. This is because such profit shifts are paid for in part by foreign firms in the bidding competition for the privatized firm in the auction. It is also shown that small local equity requirements are likely to be beneficial, but large ones are counterproductive, preventing welfare‐enhancing foreign acquisitions.