The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India
构建了一个政治代理模型，论证了更知情和更活跃的选民能增强政府回应性，并用印度面板数据证明，在报纸发行量更高和选举问责更强的地区，政府对粮食减产和洪灾的救济支出更及时。
The determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens are a key issue in political economy. Here, we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems. Having a more informed and politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive. This suggests that there is a role for both democratic institutions and mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reected in policy. The ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from India. We show that state governments are more responsive to falls in food production and crop ood damage via public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure where newspaper circulation is higher and electoral accountability greater.