On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices
从理论角度解释了为何零公开保留价（绝对拍卖）或秘密保留价拍卖在实践中常见却令人困惑，通过考虑买家处理历史数据的差异，证明这些拍卖形式会在竞争环境中内生出现，并分析了不同精明程度的买家与不同成本的卖家如何选择不同形式，提供了可检验的预测。
From a theory viewpoint, the use of auctions with zero public reserve prices, also called absolute auctions, or of auctions with secret reserve prices, is somewhat puzzling despite being common. By allowing that buyers differ in their processing of past data regarding how the participation rate varies with the auction format and how reserve prices are distributed when secret, we show in a competitive environment that these auction formats may endogenously emerge. We also analyze how buyers with various sophistications and sellers with various costs sort into the different formats, thereby offering a range of testable predictions. Alternative approaches are reviewed.