FOR-PROFIT SEARCH PLATFORMS
研究营利性平台在动态搜索匹配市场中的最优定价，发现通过买卖双方参与费可实现最优机制，且垄断中介可能提升社会福利。
We consider optimal pricing by a profit‐maximizing platform running a dynamic search and matching market. Buyers and sellers enter in cohorts over time, meet, and bargain under private information. The optimal centralized mechanism, which involves posting a bid–ask spread, can be decentralized through participation fees charged by the intermediary to both sides. The sum of buyers' and sellers' fees equals the sum of inverse hazard rates of the marginal types, and their ratio equals the ratio of buyers' and sellers' bargaining weights. We also show that a monopolistic intermediary in a search market may be welfare enhancing.