Can Helping the Sick Hurt the Able? Incentives, Information and Disruption in a Welfare Reform
研究了英国Jobcentre Plus改革如何强化官僚帮助残疾福利领取者就业的激励，发现长期使残疾福利退出增加10%且失业流出不变，但短期因重组干扰导致失业退出减少。
Abstract The UK Jobcentre Plus reform sharpened bureaucratic incentives to help disability benefit recipients (relative to unemployment insurance recipients) into jobs. In the long run, the policy raised exits off diasability benefits by 10% and left unemployment outflows roughly unchanged, consistent with (i) beneficial effects of reorganising welfare offices for both groups, and (ii) a shift in bureaucrats' efforts towards getting disability benefit recipients into jobs relative to those on unemployment benefit. The policy accounted for about 30% of the decline in the aggregate disability rolls between 2003 and 2008. In the short run, however, we detect a reduction in unemployment exits and no effect on disability exits, suggesting important initial disruption effects from the big reorganisation. This highlights the difficulty of welfare reform as policymakers may focus on the short-run political costs rather than the long-run economic benefits.