Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
研究第一价格密封投标拍卖中企业降低成本的激励，发现企业因预期竞争加剧而投资不足，且第一价格拍卖比第二价格拍卖投资更少，导致社会效率损失。
This paper investigates firms' incentives to invest in cost reduction in the first price sealed bid auction, a format largely used for procurement. Two central features of the model are that we allow firms to be heterogeneous and that investment is observable. We find that firms will tend to underinvest in cost reduction because they anticipate fiercer head-on competition. Using the second price auction as a benchmark, we also find that the first price auction will elicit less investment from market participants and that this is socially inefficient. These results have implications for market design when investment is important. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2004.