Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence
研究决策者与一组专家之间的说服博弈，专家有不同质量和议程，均衡分析表明高质量不一定更好、极端议程更优、最优专家组可能包含议程相同的专家。
We consider a persuasion game between a decision‐maker and a set of experts. Each expert is identified by two parameters: (i) “quality” or his likelihood of observing the state (i.e., learning what the best decision is) and (ii) “agenda” or the preferred decision that is independent of the state. An informed expert may feign ignorance but cannot misreport. We offer a general characterization of the equilibrium. From the decision‐maker's standpoint, (a) higher quality is not necessarily better, (b) extreme agendas are always preferred, and (c) the optimal panel may involve experts with identical (rather than conflicting) agendas.