形象与虚报

IMAGE AND MISREPORTING

Journal of the European Economic Association · 2015
被引 61
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

通过实验分析在诚实报告能最大化金钱收益的情境下,形象考量如何导致人们虚报个人信息,发现向观众报告时虚报程度显著更高,表明过度自信可能源于寻求社会认可。

Abstract

In this paper we analyze how image utility can lead to misreporting of private information in contexts where truthful reports maximize monetary outcomes. In a controlled experiment, subjects go through a series of quiz questions and subsequently report a performance measure. We vary whether reports are made to an audience or not. In an additional feedback treatment, reports are also stated to an audience and afterwards the experimenter publicly verifies whether reports were correct. We find that in the audience treatment, stated reports are significantly higher relative to the private treatment as well as the feedback treatment. Our findings suggest that overconfident appearance might be a consequence of social approval seeking.

形象效用误报社会认可实验经济学