Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
研究了在非拟线性偏好下，分配物品并收取费用的规则能否同时满足效率和策略证明性，发现当偏好包含足够多的单位需求和至少一个多需求偏好时，不存在同时满足效率、策略证明性、个体理性和不补贴失败者的规则。
We consider the problem of allocating sets of objects to agents and collecting payments. Each agent has a preference relation over the set of pairs consisting of a set of objects and a payment. Preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Non-quasilinear preferences describe environments where the wealth effect is non-negligible: the payment level changes agents' willingness to pay for swapping sets. We investigate the existence of efficient and strategy-proof rules. A preference relation is unit-demand if given a payment level, for each set of objects, the most preferred one in the set is at least as good as the set itself; it is multi-demand if given a payment level, when an agent receives an object, receiving some additional object(s) makes him better off. We show that if a domain contains enough variety of unit-demand preferences and at least one multi-demand preference relation, and if there are more agents than objects, then no rule satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers on the domain.