Market games as social dilemmas
在基于Shapley和Shubik的交换市场实验中，尽管纳什均衡预测零或最小交易，但实际交易接近社会福利最大化水平；进一步发现，同侧交易者间的沟通会降低出价，而对侧沟通无影响。
In an experimental exchange market based on Shapley and Shubik (1977), two types of players with different preferences and endowments independently submit quantities of the goods they wish to exchange. In this context, although the Nash equilibria of the game involve zero or minimum trade, we obtain intense trade close to levels that maximize social welfare. Going a step forward, we implement communication within pairs of traders from the same (horizontal) and opposite (vertical) sides of the market. Overall, we find that horizontal communication tends to reduce bids whereas vertical communication has no effect.