Costly search with adverse selection: solicitation curse versus acceleration blessing
研究了一个卖方可以调整报价频率的动态交易模型，发现低质量卖方搜寻更积极，导致接触信号负面但可得性信号正面，两种效应在静态环境中抵消，降低搜寻成本对卖方有益，但在动态环境中可能有害。
We analyze a dynamic trading model of adverse selection where a seller can increase the frequency of strategic price quotes. A low‐quality seller benefits more from trade and, therefore, searches more intensively than a high‐quality seller. This makes a seller's contact carry negative information but a seller's availability become a stronger indicator of high quality. In the stationary environment, the two effects exactly offset each other, and reducing search costs is weakly beneficial to the seller. In the nonstationary environment, the relative strengths of the two effects vary over time, and reducing search costs can be detrimental to the seller.