Risk Sharing in Village Economies Revisited
定量评估了有限承诺保险模型，其中合同需防止子联盟偏离，使群体规模内生，并用印度农村面板数据验证，发现最大联盟群体远小于村庄，且小群体内消费对收入升降反应对称。
Abstract We quantitatively evaluate a model of insurance with limited commitment where the requirement that contracts be immune to deviations by subcoalitions makes group size endogenous, as proposed by Genicot and Ray. We compare the model’s predictions to panel data from rural Indian villages. Apart from predicting a realistic degree of insurance, the model captures the evidence along two new dimensions: First, the largest coalition-proof groups are substantially smaller than typical villages. Second, with strong insurance in small groups, individual consumption responds symmetrically to income rises and falls, while alternative models predict strong counterfactual asymmetry.