A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers
综述了双边私人信息环境下集中市场机制设计的经济学文献，比较了单边与双边信息下的收益-效率权衡，提出了无赤字机制下有效配置的不可能性定理，并总结了实际可行的机制，对市场设计实践和研究有指导意义。
We discuss the economics literature relevant to the design of centralized two-sided market mechanisms for environments in which both buyers and sellers have private information. The existing literature and the history of spectrum auctions, including the incentive auction currently being designed by the FCC, can be employed to analyze such mechanisms. We compare the revenue– efficiency trade-off in an environment with private information on one side of the market versus the trade-off with private information on both sides of the market; we provide an impossibility theorem for the efficient allocation of goods using a deficit-free mechanism when there is private information on both sides of the market; we discuss practical deficit-free mechanisms for various environments with two-sided private information; and we provide a synthesis to guide market design efforts and related research going forward.