‘FAMILY’ OWNERSHIP, TUNNELLING AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
这篇综述梳理了家族企业如何通过隧道行为侵占其他利益相关者，以及盈余管理在其中扮演的角色，指出当前实证研究主要集中在少数情境，未来应拓展至跨国比较。
Abstract In this review paper, we bring together a number of aspects of family firms that are ubiquitous in a number of institutional contexts, often as part of larger business groups. We pay particular attention to the mechanisms by which families retain control over firms, and the incentives of the families in control to expropriate other stakeholders by way of tunnelling. We examine the role of earnings management in facilitating tunnelling, and evidence about the incidence of earnings management in family firms. Our review suggests that while the literature on these aspects of family control is rich, the contexts in which the empirical exercises are undertaken are relatively few, and hence there is considerable opportunity to expand it to other contexts, in particular in the form of cross‐country comparisons of the relative impact of agency conflicts and institutions on these issues.