A General Equilibrium Theory of Contracts in Community Supported Agriculture
研究了社区支持农业（CSA）中两种主要合同（产量合同和重量合同）的定价理论，建立两期模型分析农户与消费者的预期效用最大化行为，为未来实证研究提供可检验假设。
Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) contracts allow consumers to buy claims on a farm's future production. In turn, the consumer provides working capital to the farm during the growing season. CSA contracts also provide risk management for farmers with limited access to Federal crop insurance by transferring part of the farm's risk to the consumer. We derive a theory of CSA contract pricing for the two most prevalent types of CSA contracts: yield contracts, in which consumers receive a percentage of the farm's production, and weight contracts, in which consumers receive fixed quantities. We develop a two‐period model in which expected utility maximizing producers and consumers engage in CSA contracting in the first period based on anticipation of yields and spot prices in the second period. Using the model, we generate several testable hypotheses to be explored in future research. Additionally, we present an overview of the data necessary to test the propositions and potential challenges that might arise in related empirical work.