On Adjustment Costs and the Stability of Equilibria
利用局部博弈论，基于调整成本的存在，建立了一个非均衡动态的一般框架，并以寡头理论为例，说明调整成本常导致唯一均衡，其中市场份额与成本成反比。
In practice one does not expect conflicting agents to move instantaneously to an equilibrium. Instead the final equilibrium is often the consequence of "disequilibrium dynamics". This paper, through the use of local game theory, introduces a general framework for disequilibrium dynamics based on the existence of adjustment costs. The analysis is presented within the context of oligopoly theory and shows that the existence of adjustment costs will in many cases result in a unique equilibrium at which market shares are inversely proportional to these costs. This paper also introduces two new solution concepts for n-person normal form games.