Equilibrium in Insurance Markets With Adverse Selection When Insurers Pay Policy Dividends
研究了在逆向选择且风险类型任意多的Rothschild-Stiglitz保险市场模型中，引入保单红利规则后均衡总是存在，并分析了股票保险公司与互助保险公司共存的情形。
Abstract We show that an equilibrium always exists in the Rothschild–Stiglitz insurance market model with adverse selection and an arbitrary number of risk types, when insurance contracts include policy dividend rules. The Miyazaki–Wilson–Spence state‐contingent allocation is an equilibrium allocation (defined as a set of type‐dependent lotteries sustained at a symmetric equilibrium of a market game), and it is the only one when out‐of‐equilibrium beliefs satisfy a robustness criterion. It is shown that stock insurers and mutuals may coexist, with stock insurers offering insurance coverage at actuarial price and mutuals cross‐subsidizing risks.