The Indirect Ethics of AIG’s ‘Backdoor Bailout’
通过实验研究2008年金融危机期间美国政府间接救助美国国际集团交易对手的伦理判断，发现联合比较时间接救助被认为更不道德，而单独评价时直接救助更不道德，这种偏好反转对教学和政策有启示。
We experimentally assess the ethics of the U.S. government’s indirect bailout of the bank counterparties of American International Group during the 2008 financial crisis. When the indirect bailout is jointly compared with a counterfactual where the government directly bails out the banks, subjects judge the indirect bailout to be far more unethical. On the other hand, when the two scenarios are judged separately, subjects consider a direct bailout of banks to be more unethical. This suggests that ethical judgments of indirect versus direct action exhibit a type of preference reversal that is dependent upon whether the evaluation mode is joint or separate. The pedagogical and policy implications of this preference reversal are discussed.