Multilateral Bargaining in Networks: On the Prevalence of Inefficiencies
研究网络环境下的多边谈判模型，发现只有完全网络或环形网络才能实现有效均衡，其他网络结构下高贴现因子会导致策略性延迟和效率损失，甚至出现网络改进降低社会福利的悖论。
We introduce a new noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for network-restricted environments in which players can bargain only with their neighbors. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for efficient equilibria. If the underlying network is either complete or circular, an efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists for all discount factors—all the players always try to reach an agreement as soon as practicable, and hence no strategic delay occurs. In any other network, however, an efficient equilibrium is impossible if a discount factor is greater than a certain threshold, as some players strategically delay an agreement. We also provide an example of a Braess-like paradox, in which network improvements decrease social welfare. The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1725 .