Information Spillovers, Gains from Trade, and Interventions in Frozen Markets
研究政府在逆向选择导致的市场冻结中如何干预，发现干预太少无法恢复交易，干预太多会破坏信息生产，并刻画了平衡两者的最优政策。
We study government interventions in markets suffering from adverse selection. Importantly, asymmetric information prevents both the realization of gains from trade and the production of information that is valuable to other market participants. We find a fundamental tension in maximizing welfare: while some intervention is required to restore trading, too much intervention depletes trade of its informational content. We characterize the optimal policy that balances these two considerations, and explore how it depends on features of the environment. Our model can be used to study a program introduced in 2009 to restore information production in the market for legacy assets. Received February 19, 2014; accepted November 20, 2015 by Editor Itay Goldstein.