Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti–Tax Evasion Program *
研究了意大利全国性反逃税计划“鬼屋计划”对地方官员连任率的影响，发现计划强度每增加一个标准差，地方官员连任率提高4.8%，且效果在逃税容忍度低和公共品提供效率高的地区更显著。
Abstract The incentives of political agents to enforce tax collection are key determinants of the levels of compliance. We study the electoral response to the Ghost Buildings program, a nationwide anti tax evasion policy in Italy that used innovative monitoring technologies to target buildings hidden from tax authorities. The program induced monetary and non-monetary benefits for non-evaders and an increase in local government expenditures. A one standard deviation increase in town-level program intensity leads to a 4.8% increase in local incumbent reelection rates. In addition, these political returns are higher in areas with lower tax evasion tolerance and with higher efficiency of public good provision, implying complementarity among enforcement policies, the underlying tax culture, and the quality of the government.