Crash Risk and the Auditor–Client Relationship
研究审计师任期与未来股价崩盘风险的关系，发现任期越长，审计师越能发现并阻止客户隐藏坏消息，从而降低崩盘风险，对审计监管有政策启示。
Abstract This study examines whether the term of the auditor–client relationship (i.e., auditor tenure) is associated with future stock price crash risk measured both ex ante and ex post. Using a large sample of U.S. public firms with Big 4 auditors, we find robust evidence that auditor tenure is negatively related to one‐year‐ahead stock price crash risk. The evidence is consistent with monitoring‐by‐learning where development of client‐specific knowledge over the term of the auditor–client relationship enhances auditors’ ability to detect and deter bad news hoarding activities by clients, thereby reducing future crash risk. This result holds even after controlling for endogeneity of the tenure/crash risk relation. We further provide evidence indicating that option market investors do not fully incorporate the information contained in the term of auditor–client relationship in predicting future stock price crash risk. Our empirical results have important policy implications for regulators concerned with ensuring auditor independence.