The impact of fleet size on performance-based incentive management
研究了基于绩效的合同中，车队规模如何影响备件库存系统的可靠性、服务时间及激励设计，对管理者优化合同条款有参考价值。
Performance-based contracting (PBC) is envisioned to lower the asset ownership cost while ensuring desired system performance. System availability, widely used as a performance metric in such contracts, is affected by multiple factors such as equipment reliability, spares stock, fleet size, and service capacity. Prior studies have either focussed on ensuring parts availability or advocating the reliability allocation during design. This paper investigates a single echelon repairable inventory model in PBC. We focus on reliability improvement and its interaction with decisions affecting service time, taking into account the operating fleet size. The study shows that component reliability in a repairable inventory system is a function of the operating fleet size and service rate. A principal-agent model is further developed to evaluate the impact of the fleet size on the incentive mechanism design. The numerical study confirms that the fleet size plays a critical role in determining the penalty and cost sharing rates when the number of backorders is used as the negative incentive scheme.