Round‐Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player
分析了循环赛制中一个强选手和两个弱选手的子博弈完美均衡，比较了循环赛和一次性竞赛在预期收益、总努力和获胜概率上的差异，发现不对称程度低时用一次性竞赛、高时用循环赛。
Abstract We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the round‐robin tournament with one strong (dominant) and two weak players, and we compare this tournament and the one‐stage contest with respect to the players' expected payoffs, expected total effort, and their probabilities of winning. We find that if the contest designer's goal is to maximize the players' expected total effort, then – if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low – the one‐stage contest should be used. However, if the asymmetry is relatively high, then the round‐robin tournament should be used.