Does Board Independence Affect Audit Fees? Evidence from Recent Regulatory Reforms
利用2002年美国立法要求上市公司董事会多数独立这一改革，采用双重差分法研究发现，在信息环境强的公司中，董事会独立性提高与审计费用增加相关，而在信息环境弱的公司中关系不显著。
To enhance board oversight, since 2002, US legislation has required listed companies to have a majority independent board. This paper uses this legislative change to examine the relation between board independence and audit fees. To provide a clean estimate of this relation, we adopt a difference-in-difference approach using a sample matched on client firm characteristics. We find that greater board independence is insignificantly associated with a change in audit fees when client firms operate in a weak information environment. When the information environment is strong, greater board independence is associated with an increase in audit fees. Our results are consistent with the nascent theory emphasizing information asymmetry and provide insight into the effectiveness of the mandated board independence in relation to audit quality.