Condorcet meets Ellsberg
研究了在选民具有共同价值观但可能表现出埃尔斯伯格式模糊厌恶时，孔多塞陪审团定理的结论如何被颠覆，发现至少在一个状态下正确候选人获胜的均衡概率不超过二分之一，信息无法聚合。
The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common values, the equilibrium probability that the correct candidate wins goes to one as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. This paper studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity averse -- exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior -- as modeled by maxmin expected utility preferences. It provides sufficient conditions so that the equilibrium probability of the correct candidate winning the election is bounded above by one half in at least one state. As a consequence, there is no equilibrium in which information aggregates.