Optimal price‐level drift under commitment in the canonical New Keynesian model
研究了在经典新凯恩斯模型中，当央行和私人部门在观察到当前冲击前做决策时，承诺下的最优货币政策不再保证价格水平稳定，而是存在显著的最优价格水平漂移，这对央行设计损失函数有重要启示。
Abstract In both the canonical and many extended versions of the New Keynesian model, optimal monetary policy under commitment implies price‐level stationarity as long as expectations are rational. We show that this is no longer the case if the central bank and private agents make decisions before observing current shocks. The optimal amount of price‐level drift in response to unexpected innovations to inflation is quantitatively important. This result has important implications for monetary policy, including the design of the optimal loss function for the central bank if it cannot commit to its future policies.