Rewards and punishments: Informal contracting through social preferences
构建了一个非正式契约的正向模型，其中奖励和惩罚不由事前最优计划决定，而是表达仲裁方事后的道德情感，分析了委托人社会偏好对代理人激励的影响，并推导出关于外部性在非正式环境中如何内部化的可检验预测。
This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can privately assess the contribution of an agent to the welfare of a broader group. In the absence of formal contingent contracts, the principal chooses ex post transfers that maximize her social preferences. We characterize the incentives induced by the principal's preferences, contrast them with ex ante optimal contracts, and derive novel testable predictions about the way externalities are internalized in informal settings.