Differentiated Standards and Patent Pools
研究了差异化标准下必要专利持有者组建专利池的动机，分析了池内协调与标准间竞争对池稳定性和社会福利的影响，发现促进标准兼容的政策可能提高或降低福利。
Abstract We consider patent pool formation by owners of essential patents for differentiated standards that may be complements or substitutes in use. Pooling improves coordination in terms of royalty setting within a standard but provokes a strategic response from licensors in the competing standard. We characterise the incentives to form and defect from pools within standards and show how pool formation and stability depend on competition between standards. We also examine strategic patent pool formation by consortium standards and show that policies promoting compatibility of standards may increase or decrease welfare depending on the effects on the incentives to form pools.