Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders
研究了信息不对称下动态讨价还价中外部事件（如新交易者到达）的影响，发现到达可能性会改变均衡动态，导致交易延迟，卖方通过等待到达即可获得相同收益。
We study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and arrival of exogenous events, which represent arrival of traders or information. We characterize the unique limit of stationary equilibria with frequent offers. The possibility of arrivals changes equilibrium dynamics. There is delay in equilibrium, and the seller slowly screens out buyers with higher valuations. The seller payoff equals what he can achieve by simply awaiting an arrival. In applications, when buyer valuations fall, average prices drop and delay increases. Surplus division depends on relative arrival rates of buyers/sellers and expected time to trade is a nonmonotonic function of the arrival rate.