Experimental Evidence of Differential Auditor Pricing and Reporting Strategies
通过实验室市场实验，检验审计定价与独立性的竞争均衡模型，发现部分市场中审计师与客户合作偏离了低价揽客和独立性受损的预测。
This study tests the competitive equilibrium predictions of a multi-period model of audit pricing and independence in two sets of laboratory markets: a control set consisting of human subjects in the role of auditors contracting with robot clients, and a treatment set of which both auditors and clients are human subjects. The results in all the control-set markets and some of the treatment markets support the predictions of lowball pricing and that heterogeneous beliefs among auditors regarding the treatment of a client-reporting issue is a necessary condition for independence impairment. By contrast, several treatment-set markets exhibit cooperative behavior between auditors and clients to achieve jointly beneficial outcomes. This behavior deviates from the price-independence relationship predicted in the competitive equilibrium, exhibiting instead a price-independence relationship that is characterized by an absence of lowballing and frequent independence impairment, even when auditors have homogeneous beliefs.