Opening the Black Box: Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Power
利用跨国集团内部业务单元的计划与实际资本配置数据及CEO调查，发现现金意外增加时，权力更大的经理获得更多资金并过度投资，导致其所在单元后续绩效和生产率下降，揭示了权力导致资源配置低效的渠道。
ABSTRACT We analyze the internal capital markets of a multinational conglomerate, using a unique panel data set of planned and actual allocations to business units and a survey of unit CEOs. Following cash windfalls, more powerful managers obtain larger allocations and increase investment substantially more than their less connected peers. We identify cash windfalls as a source of misallocation of capital, as more powerful managers overinvest and their units exhibit lower ex post performance and productivity. These findings contribute to our understanding of frictions in resource allocation within firms and point to an important channel through which power may lead to inefficiencies.