Competitive federalism, government's dual role and the power to tax
指出民主政府在竞争性联邦制中扮演领土企业和俱乐部企业双重角色，并分析退出机制在这两种角色下的不同含义，对研究政府征税权与公民选择有启发。
Abstract Theories of competitive federalism generally focus on exit as the principal mechanism for making governments responsive to the interests of those who are subject to their powers. This paper draws attention to the fact that democratic governments act in two distinguishable roles, as ‘territorial enterprises’ and as ‘club enterprises’. As territorial enterprises they define and enforce the rules and terms that apply to everybody, whether citizen or alien, who resides and/or operates within their jurisdictional boundaries. As club enterprises , they define and enforce the rules and terms of membership in the respective polity. The focus of this paper is on the implications of the fact that ‘exit’ means something different when one looks at governments’ role as territorial enterprises (exit = leaving the territory) in contrast to their role as club enterprises (exit = giving up one's membership status/citizenship).