Fighting for Votes: Theory and Evidence on the Causes of Electoral Violence
提出选举前暴力理论，认为政治竞争激烈、暴力支持者众多且极化程度高时，政党更可能使用暴力；并用布隆迪2010年选举数据验证了该理论。
I develop a theory of pre‐electoral violence, in which parties resort to violent tactics if political competition is tight and violent supporters are numerous, and if polarization between violent supporters is high. The importance of these conditions varies with the type of violence (clashes, intimidation or murders). I test the model using data on the 2010 elections in Burundi. In line with the model, electoral violence before the election was more likely in municipalities characterized by both close political competition and high density of demobilized combatants. Violence was also more likely where polarization between demobilized combatants was high.