Resale Price Maintenance In Two‐Sided Markets
研究了竞争性双边平台对转售价格维持的激励及其对终端消费者的影响，发现当平台竞争足够强时，平台会设定最低转售价格以同时提高双边价格，而线性需求下最低价格降低总福利、最高价格提升总福利。
We consider competing two‐sided platforms selling directly to one side of the market, and through an agent to the other side. Platforms offer nonlinear tariffs, and can choose whether to contract with the same or different agents. We study the platforms’ incentives to impose resale price maintenance (RPM), and the effect on end customers. We find that, even if customers on both sides value each other's participation, platforms impose minimum RPM to raise prices on both sides simultaneously if platform competition is sufficiently strong. In a linear demand example, we find that overall welfare decreases with minimum prices and increases with maximum prices.