COMMITMENT AND COSTLY SIGNALING IN DECENTRALIZED MARKETS
研究卖方无法承诺事前标价时，分散市场中的信息摩擦如何导致流动性不足，并发现平台通过收取上市费分割市场可缓解这一问题。
I propose a search model of a decentralized market with asymmetric information in which sellers are unable to commit to asking prices announced ex ante. Relaxing the commitment assumption prevents sellers from using price posting as a signaling device to direct buyers' search. Private information about the gains from trade and inefficient entry on the demand side then contribute to market illiquidity. Endogenous sorting among costly marketing platforms can facilitate the search process by segmenting the market to alleviate information frictions. Seemingly irrelevant but incentive compatible listing fees are implementable provided that the market is not already sufficiently active.