The Fed, the Bond Market, and Gradualism in Monetary Policy
构建了一个货币政策模型，其中央行对长期目标利率拥有私人信息且厌恶债券市场波动，导致其渐进调整利率以避免惊扰市场，但市场理性反应反而加剧了时间不一致问题，最终社会可能因央行过度关注债券市场而受损。
ABSTRACT We develop a model of monetary policy with two key features: the central bank has private information about its long‐run target rate and is averse to bond market volatility. In this setting, the central bank gradually impounds changes in its target into the policy rate. Such gradualism represents an attempt to not spook the bond market. However, this effort is partially undone in equilibrium, as markets rationally react more to a given move when the central bank moves more gradually. This time‐consistency problem means that society would be better off if the central bank cared less about the bond market.