Unobserved Heterogeneity, Exit Rates, and Re‐Employment Wages
研究了在信息不对称和定向搜索的经济中，未观测到的异质性如何导致失业退出率和再就业工资随失业时长下降，分离均衡使技能工人获得更多机会和更高工资。
Abstract Exit rates from unemployment and re‐employment wages decline over a period of unemployment, after controlling for worker observable characteristics. We study the role of unobserved heterogeneity in an economy with asymmetric information and directed search. We show that the unique equilibrium is separating and that skilled workers have more job opportunities and higher wages. The composition of the unemployed varies with the duration of unemployment, so average exit rates and wages fall with time. The separating equilibrium relies on performance‐related pay schemes and the ability of firms to commit to renting an input that is complementary to worker skills.