Economic Transition, Constitutional Choice, and Public Administration: Implementing Privatization in Hungary
研究了匈牙利等东欧国家大规模私有化政策的实施过程，发现西方政策实施理论在转型国家中适用性有限，因为公共与私营部门的同步分化、中央与地方政府的宪法选择以及中立专业公务员的角色等因素使实施更加复杂。
For the past several years, Hungary and other nations of Eastern Europe have embarked on programs to achieve large-scale privatization. An examination of the implementation effort in Hungary demonstrates some success, but also substantial difficulties. Theories about policy implementation as developed in the West are of limited use in interpreting the dynamics of change currently underway in Hungary. Implementation in such settings is complicated by the nearly simultaneous differentiation and coevolution of public and private sectors, basic constitutional choices on allocation of governmental responsibility between central and local levels, and determination of the role of neutral and expert public service in the regime. The case points to the contextuality of extant implementation theories and their implicit links to a set of assumed constitutional characteristics largely absent now in transitional settings. More generalizable theory of policy implementation is dependent on analyzing the connections between the details of implementation and issues of basic constitutional choice.