How Do Unemployment Insurance Benefits Affect the Decision to Apply for Social Security Disability Insurance?
利用收入与福利调查数据匹配行政记录，发现更高的失业保险金会减少伤残保险申请，每增加1美元失业保险金可节省15美分伤残保险支出，对政策制定者有参考价值。
Abstract This paper examines whether Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits affect the decision to apply for Social Security Disability Insurance (DI). Using data from the Survey of Income and Benefits matched to administrative records on DI applications, I find that higher UI benefits reduce applications for DI. This substitution effect is imprecisely estimated but economically significant, implying that a $1.00 increase in UI benefits reduces DI expenditures by 15 cents. Recognizing this cost-saving effect would increase the optimal UI benefit level by more than 20 percent for coefficients of relative risk aversion ranging from two to five.