Strategic design under uncertain evaluations: structural analysis of design‐build auctions
研究了设计-建造拍卖中，投标者在设计评估不确定时如何竞争价格和产品设计，发现不确定性会提高设计质量的预期价格并加剧拍卖结果的不确定性，主要源于投标策略的变化。
Abstract I investigate firms' competition over price and product design under uncertain design evaluations in the context of Design‐Build (DB) auctions. Reviewers' design evaluations contain uncertainty from a bidder's perspective, leading luck to dampen differences in the firms' chances of winning. I model bidders' behavior and show semiparametric identification of the model primitives. Uncertain design evaluations increase the expected price of design quality and exacerbate an auctioneer's uncertainty in auction outcomes. These effects are mostly due to changes in bidding strategies. Bid ranking swaps due to uncertain evaluations account for a small share of these effects.