EXPLAINING COORDINATION BETWEEN NATIONAL REGULATORS IN EU AGENCIES: THE ROLE OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
本文运用文化理论，通过分析正式与非正式社会组织（即欧盟机构的约束和专业社群共享规范）如何影响国家监管机构的协调机制，解释了欧盟不同政策领域协调方式差异的原因，并以食品、海事安全和银行监管三个案例进行实证。
Coordination between national regulators in EU agencies is based on a variety of mechanisms – such as mutual exchange and hierarchy – which the existing literature has extensively documented. However, it has paid less attention to explaining such variation. This article suggests that cultural theory can systematically integrate the observation of varied coordination mechanisms into one framework. More crucially, cultural theory also provides a coherent theoretical explanation for variation of coordination mechanisms by pointing to the importance of formal and informal social organization: the grid and group boundedness of national regulators, namely the constraints exercised on them by EU bodies and by the shared norms of their professional communities, can account for the emergence of different types of coordination across policy sectors. The article demonstrates this by presenting original empirical research on three cases, namely coordination between national regulators in the EU agencies responsible for food and maritime safety, as well as banking regulation.