Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes
构建并估计了一个劳动力市场均衡模型，其中低效员工被系统性地从信息不对称和道德风险部门淘汰，导致从未被解雇员工的工资随任期增长，即使没有长期合同。
I develop and estimate an equilibrium model of the labor market in which inefficient employees are systematically eliminated from the sector of the market characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard. Systematic selection on the distribution of productivity characteristics produces wage sequences that are increasing in tenure for employees never previously terminated even in the absence of long-term contracting between employees and individual firms. I provide sufficient conditions for there to exist a unique termination-contract type of equilibrium, and I estimate the equilibrium model using microlevel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth panel.