MARRIAGE, MARKETS, AND MONEY: A COASIAN THEORY OF HOUSEHOLD FORMATION
将婚姻和货币的搜寻模型结合，视家庭为科斯意义上的组织，发现市场摩擦（如税收、搜寻成本）和通货膨胀税会提高结婚倾向，并用微观和宏观数据验证。
This article integrates search‐based models of marriage and money. We think about households as organizations, the way Coase thinks about firms, as alternatives to markets that become more attractive when transactions costs increase. In the model, individuals consume market‐ and home‐produced goods, and home production is facilitated by marriage. Market frictions, including taxes, search, and bargaining problems, increase the marriage propensity. The inflation tax encourages marriage because being single is cash intensive. Microdata confirm singles use cash more than married people. We use macrodata over many countries to investigate how marriage responds to inflation, taxation, and other variables.