VALUE OF INFORMATION IN COMPETITIVE ECONOMIES WITH INCOMPLETE MARKETS
研究了不完全市场下公共信息变化对福利的影响，发现信息变化可能使所有代理人变好或变坏，但计划者总能实现帕累托改进，表明市场竞争对信息变化的反应通常非社会最优。
We study the value of public information in competitive economies with incomplete markets. We show that generically the welfare effect of a change in the information available prior to trading can be in any direction: There exist changes in information that make all agents better off and changes for which all agents are worse off. In contrast, for any change in information, a Pareto improvement is feasible, that is, attainable by a planner facing the same informational and asset market constraints as agents. In this sense, the response of competitive markets to changes in information is typically not socially optimal.