MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
利用人们对婚外选项的估值及对配偶选项的信念数据，发现部分夫妻中一方在婚外更幸福而另一方更不幸福，表明存在讨价还价和私人信息；估计的相互依赖效用模型量化了低效率，结果显示人们为让配偶更好而牺牲部分效用，从而抵消了信息不完全造成的低效率。
We use data on people's valuations of options outside marriage and beliefs about spouses' options. The data demonstrate that, in some couples, one spouse would be happier and the other spouse unhappier outside of some marriages, suggesting that bargaining takes place and that spouses have private information. We estimate a bargaining model with interdependent utility that quantifies the resulting inefficiencies. Our results show that people forgo some utility in order to make their spouses better off and, in doing so, offset much of the inefficiency generated by their imperfect knowledge. Thus, we find evidence of asymmetric information and interdependent utility in marriage.