The Bureaucratic Politics Paradox: The Case of Wetlands Legislation in Nevada
研究了美国内政部和内华达州野生动物局的中低层官僚如何秘密推动联邦和州立法，违背上级意愿获得项目改革权力，并评估了这种“组织越轨者”现象对公共管理的启示。
The importance of the environment in which public managers work and in which public organizations seek to thrive is undeniable. Organization theorists maintain that organizations both are shaped by and seek to shape the environment in which they exist. That public managers need to be aware of and work with forces in their environment is almost commonsensical. Yet there is little empirical evidence in either the organizations theory literature or the bureaucratic politics literature of lower level and middle level professional career public managers actually attempting to shape their environment. This article examines a successful clandestine effort by lower and middle level bureaucrats in the U.S. Department of Interior and the Nevada Department of Wildlife to have legislation enacted at both the federal and state levels that empowered them to make changes in their programs against the wishes of their superiors. The bureaucratic politics behind the legislation is documented and the paradox posed by these policy innovators who are also “organization deviants” is assessed. This is done by examining fourteen guidelines or lessons learned from the Nevada experience from the perspective of the “deviant” bureaucrats and assessing the implications of this phenomenon for public management.